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ABSTRACT 
The CPA exam provides an evaluation of the auditors’ professional competences at the 
early stages of their careers. Using information from the results generated in Sweden, the paper 
shows that i) auditors at Big 4 firms are younger when they take the exam, ii) younger auditors 
and auditors at Big 4 firms perform better in the exam iii) there is a positive association between 
the results in the CPA exam and wage increases after having received the CPA certification and 
the association is stronger at Big 4 firms. This evidence is consistent with a theoretical model 
where Big 4 audit firms attract and retain the more capable auditors of each cohort, based on 
the imperfect information about the capabilities of the auditors that they have. 
 
 
 
Key words: CPA exam, auditors’ compensation, unobserved capabilities, Big 4, 
professional careers. 
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1. Introduction 
“While our core business is all about delivering exceptional service to our clients, we 
know that if we attract and retain the best people – and invest in them – we will deliver the best 
results for our clients”. This statement is from the web page of EY but presumably most audit 
firms would agree with it.1 There is evidence suggesting that Big 4 firms conduct audits of 
higher quality (e.g., Francis, 2004; 2011; Knechel et al., 2013). One would expect the 
differences in strategic focus of Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms would have consequences for their 
hiring and compensation policies. This paper focuses on some of these differences. 
The appointment of apt workers is complicated by the fact that information about the 
ability of workers is to a large extent unknown at the time of employment (for a review of 
related literature in personnel economics, see Lazear and Oyer, 2012). Based on literature about 
employer learning models (Harris and Holmström, 1982; Lange 2007) and assignment models 
(e.g., Sattinger, 1975; 1993), we study some issues related to the capabilities of auditors. We 
focus on the early phase of auditors’ careers, namely the years before and after passing the CPA 
exam. Audit firms employ workers as audit associates at least during a 3-year period before the 
CPA exam is taken but the length of this period varies, among other things, with how well-
prepared auditors feel they are to take the exam. We develop a theoretical model predicting that 
more able auditors will do the exam earlier and perform better than their cohort mates. Then, if 
Big 4 audit firms have a competitive advantage for attracting and retaining the most proper 
auditors of each entering cohort, we expect that auditors at Big 4 firms do the exam earlier and 
perform better. Furthermore, if firms have imperfect information about the auditor’s 
capabilities, the performance in the exam will provide information about the capabilities of the 
                                                          
1 The quotation is taken from http://www.ey.com/UK/en/About-us/Corporate-Responsibility (retrieved December 
2015). 
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auditor. Thus, the performance in the CPA exam is expected to be used for updating believes 
about auditors’ capabilities and consequently their wages.  
We provide empirical tests of the predictions. Using data for 1,377 auditors that attempted 
to take the Swedish CPA exam for the first time in the 2007 to 2012 period, we find empirical 
support for the predictions that the performance in the exam is a function of age and Big 4 
affiliation. Furthermore, using wage data two years before and two years after the CPA 
certification for 431 auditors, we find support for the prediction that the performance in the 
exam is positively associated with wage increases. Furthermore, this result appears to be mainly 
driven by auditors at Big 4 firms. 
The study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, although it has been 
suggested that the Big 4 accountancy firms have lots to teach other companies about managing 
talented people2, there are few studies attempting to use economic theory to analyze personnel 
economics issues in the auditing industry. The available evidence we are aware of focus on 
auditors much later in their careers. To mention a few contributions, Trompeter (1994) provide 
experimental evidence indicating that partners with compensation more closely linked to client 
retention are less likely to require downward adjustments of the client’s earnings, suggesting 
that the design of compensation schemes can have an impact on auditors’ objectivity. Liu and 
Simunic (2005) provide a theoretical analysis of how features of compensation plans in audit 
firms are expected to vary with client complexity. The sole empirical study we are aware of is 
Knechel, Niemi and Zerni (2013), who empirically study the determinants of compensation of 
audit partners in Swedish Big 4 audit firms. All the studies above focus on issues relevant for 
auditors in charge of assignments. We are not aware of any prior analytical or empirical studies 
focusing on the early phases of the career of auditors. 
                                                          
2 See ”Accounting for good people, The Economist, July 21st of 2007, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/9507322. (Retrieved December 2015). 
5 
 
More generally, this study adds new evidence for the understanding of internal labor 
markets in a whole industry, the Swedish auditing market. The CPA exam generates data with 
a set of unique properties. It provides a measure of professional competences homogenous for 
workers of all the firms competing in a concrete market. The performance in the CPA Exam 
has not a direct impact on the profits of the firms and it took at the early stages of the auditors’ 
careers. We are not aware of any prior studies in which the role of unobserved capabilities has 
been studied in theoretical models of entry to the auditing or other professions.3 While most of 
the evidence available about the assignment of workers to firms is focused at the top of the 
hierarchical organizations (e.g. Bandiera et al., 2015; Terviö, 2008; Gabaix and Landier, 2008) 
this paper provides evidence on the assignment to firms in the early phase of auditors’ careers. 
Initial empirical evidence related with employer learning about workers’ capabilities has 
focused on the variance of wage equations (e.g., Murphy, 1986; Baker et al., 1994; Poppo and 
Weigelt, 2000; Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás, 2006). Another approach has been to assume that 
researchers have a better proxy of the capabilities of the employee than employers have and test 
how the correlation between wages and the proxy of the capabilities increases with time (e.g., 
Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Bauer and Haisken-DeNew, 2001; Lange, 
2007). Recently, Taylor (2013) analyzes how the CEO wages are updated when new 
information related with the innate abilities of the workers is generated. This paper extends this 
evidence. More concretely, we show how the firms update the wages of the auditors based on 
a capabilities’ measure, the scores in the CPA exam, unrelated with the performance of the firm. 
This makes us more confident that the relationship between wages and information is not due 
to incentive contracts. 
                                                          
3 Bagues and Perez-Villadoniga (2012) or Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) analyze quite different aspects of the 
access to the Corps of Spanish Judiciary. 
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Finally, the study contributes to the literature about factors associated with the 
performance in the CPA exam. There is literature (Brahmasrene and Witten, 2001; Grant et al., 
2002; Allen and Woodland, 2006; Boone et al., 2006) analyzing the determinants of passing 
the CPA exam in the US. However, this literature focuses on how educational requirements 
affect the performance in the exam. Thus, besides providing evidence from another country, we 
also focus on other factors affecting the performance in the exam. The paper provides first 
evidence that the audit firm where the auditor is employed plays a significant role in the decision 
of taking the CPA exam and the performance in the exam. Furthermore, following Reilly and 
Stettler (1972) the predominant theoretical benchmark in this literature has been the human 
capital theory highlighting the impact of the investments made before the exam. Against a 
straightforward application of the human capital theory, Morgan (2015) stresses the fact that a 
delay in the exam is negatively correlated with the success in the CPA exam, what is supported 
also in our data. Our model reconciles this evidence with a more elaborated application of the 
human capital theory. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional 
setting. Section 3 develops the theoretical framework. The empirical approach is presented in 
Section 4 and Section 5 provides the empirical findings. Section 6 discusses the results and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional setting 
2.1 The Swedish audit market 
Similarly as in other EU countries, audits are statutory for privately as well as publicly 
held companies. EU directives give countries the right to exempt smaller entities from the 
statutory audit requirement. Up to 2010, Sweden had not used this possibility but instead 
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required all limited liability companies to be audited regardless of their size. Starting from 2010 
the very smallest limited liability companies are exempted from the statutory audit. However, 
the vast majority of all firms audited are yet privately held companies. 
The Big 4 audit firms are dominant at the Swedish audit market. Their accumulated 
revenues equal 81.2 % of all revenues reported by the twelve largest audit firms, and they 
employ around 50 % of all certified auditors in Sweden. PwC is by far the largest audit firm in 
terms of revenues and number of employees, followed by EY, KPMG, and Deloitte. Only ten 
out of 268 listed companies were audited by a non–Big 4 audit firm in 2011, the auditing firms 
were Grant Thornton, BDO and Mazars SET. These three firms have international partners and 
followed in size order after the Big 4. In all, the Swedish audit market consists of over 900 audit 
firms. The group of small audit firms include a large number of sole proprietors. 
Only certified public accountants (CPAs) can sign audit reports. The number of CPAs 
registered with the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants (SBPA) is around 4,000. In 2005, 
there were a total of 4,152 qualified auditors, while this figure was down to 3,994 and 3,857 in 
2009 and 2013, respectively. In 2012, the Big 4 firms employed 1,943 CPAs of which 591 
where audit partners (30.4%). 
 2.2 CPA certification  
The career of auditors starts when audit firms hire them, which typically takes place 
directly after having completed the university education. Once employed, they start by working 
together with one or several certified auditors as audit associates and in parallel they take a 
large amount of courses that are useful for audit work and as a preparation for the CPA exam.4  
                                                          
4 Until 2013, those approved public accountants (after two years of experience and some other requirements) can 
do another exam and apply for being an authorized public accountant. After the legal change in 2013, there are 
now only approved public accountants. The analyses in this study are based on the results in the exam for being 
approved public accountant. Approved public accountants were qualified to audit all types of companies, including 
listed companies. Further information can be found at http://www.far.se/. 
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Each of the Big 4 audit firms arrange a large portfolio of courses internally, which audit 
associates are expected to complete. Audit associates at Big 4 firms only rarely take courses 
that are not arranged in-house. Audit associates employed at smaller audit firms instead 
typically take courses that are arranged by “FAR Akademi”, the Institute of Professional 
Accountants. 
The CPA exam shall assure that the auditors have a sufficient theoretical knowledge to 
conduct statutory audits in companies of different sizes having different types of operations. 
Furthermore, the exam should assure the auditors have the ability to apply the theoretical 
knowledge in their auditing practice (Auditing Decree § 3). The main requirements for CPA 
certification are that the auditor (i) have at least three years of practical auditing experience, (ii) 
have at least a Bachelor’s degree with a major in Business Administration, (iii) have passed the 
examination of professional competence as approved public accountant (CPA exam), and (iv) 
meet some general eligibility criteria (Auditing Act § 4; Auditing Decree § 4). Furthermore, for 
upholding certification it is also required that the auditor is professionally active as an auditor 
(at least 1500 hours over a 5-year period), is employed by an audit firm and undertakes 
continuous education; otherwise certification will be lost (Auditing Act §§ 4 and 8; Auditing 
Decree § 8).  
The CPA exam is organized by the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants (SBPA) 
twice a year, in May and December, and the results from the exam are published in July and 
January of the same or next year respectively. The work with the examination is organized as 
follows. An audit firm (typically one of the Big 4) is hired to prepare exam drafts as well as to 
correct the exams. Different types of experts at the audit firm, such as lawyers and accounting 
experts, provide input to the process. An examination committee, consisting of three practicing 
auditors and two university professors, comment exam drafts, and supervise the preparation and 
the correction of the exam. The audit firm which is responsible for correcting the exam receives 
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only anonymous files with the applicants’ answers. The cost of writing the exam is currently 
25,000 Swedish krona (SEK); around 3,020 US Dollars (USD). This expense is typically paid 
by the employer. Thus, employers are likely to screen possible applicants and only allow those 
with fairly good possibilities to pass the exam to participate. The CPA certification gives the 
right to sign audit reports. Files with the results in the exam are available upon request from the 
SBPA. 
 
3.  The theoretical framework 
3.1 Capabilities in personnel economics: main building blocks of the model. 
Issues related to the professional competence and capabilities plays an important role in 
the internal labor markets and personnel economics literatures (e.g., Waldman, 2012; Lazear 
and Oyer, 2012). Below we briefly review the related literature and present the building blocks 
of our model. One stream of literature focuses on human capital development in firms. Starting 
from Mincer (1974) a typical approach has been to model the accumulation of human capital 
as an additive and increasing function of investments in education and experience. A summary 
of the early “human capital” literature can be found in Blaug (1976). A second stream of 
literature focuses on the assignment of workers to different types of firms (e.g., Sattinger 1975, 
1993). Applied on our setting, this literature focuses on the matching of right auditors with the 
right audit firms and job positions.5  
A final stream related to our study is the literature about “employer learning models”. 
Starting from Harris and Holmström (1982), this literature has used Bayesian inference for 
                                                          
5 An example of an application of an “assignment models” in another setting is Bandiera et al. (2015), who studied 
managers in the sale and service sectors in Italy. Terviö (2008), as well as Gabaix and Lander (2008), used 
assignment models as the starting point for their studies of CEO compensation. 
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modeling how current performance is used for learning about workers’ innate abilities.6 Applied 
on our setting, “employer-learning models” suggest that firms and auditors base the hiring and 
compensation decisions on the imperfect information that they have about auditors’ 
capabilities, and this information is updated (they learn) accordingly with the signals that the 
performance of the auditors generates. 
In the prior literature learning has frequently been modeled as a function of the experience 
of the employer with the worker. We study a specific signal, namely the performance in the 
CPA exam. The CPA exam is an evaluation of the auditors’ professional competences and, as 
described above, taken when the audit firm has a few years of experience with the audit 
associate but yet at a point in time when the audit firm is likely to have far from complete 
information about the capability of the auditor. Thus, the CPA exam arguably provides new 
information to the audit firm about the auditor’s capabilities.  
Another feature of the Swedish setting is that the timing of the CPA exam will convey 
information about the capabilities of auditors. A minimum of three years of practical experience 
is needed before an auditor can attempt to take the CPA exam but auditors will postpone the 
exam if they feel they are not well prepared enough. In practice, this decision is likely to be 
taken after discussions with the employer, since the employer typically pays the examination 
fee and may also allow the auditor to use working time for studies. The preparation is naturally 
also time-consuming and costly for the auditor, and therefore, the decision to attempt to take 
the CPA exam will be a thoughtful one. On the one-hand the postponement of the exam will 
increase the chances of passing at the first attempt but on the other hand it will also delay the 
wage increases and other benefits associated with the CPA certification. Besides that the trade-
off will be influenced by the learning environment at the audit firm, it will also be influenced 
                                                          
6 There is also a number of empirical studies, mainly of CEO compensation, based on learning models (e.g., Taylor 
2013; Pan et al. 2015). 
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by the capability of the auditor, a fact used in our theoretical model. In effect, based on “human 
capital models” one would expect that the performance in the CPA exam is improving with 
tenure (measured as age in the model below). However, “employer-learning models” recognize 
that some differences among auditors of the same cohort exist. Market agents, auditors and 
firms, have imperfect information about such differences in capabilities. 
Following “assignment models” we assume that audit firms use this information for 
allocating auditors to job positions and there are complementarities between the size of the firm 
and the auditors’ capabilities. Big 4 firms audit the vast majority of all publicly traded clients, 
which are in general more complex and associated with higher litigation risk than private 
clients. Furthermore, some studies also suggest that Big 4 firms supply services of higher 
quality than non-Big 4 firms (e.g., Francis 2011). This suggests that tasks in Big 4 firms on 
average are more demanding than in non-Big 4 firms, implying that have a demand for more 
skilled workers. We capture this feature of the audit market in the model by assuming that the 
marginal productivity of capabilities is higher in Big 4 firms. 
In fact, the assumptions related with auditors’ capabilities used in the model have been 
previously combined (Gibbons and Waldman 1999 and 2006, Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumàs 
2006, Waldman 2012) for analyzing different contexts than the one analyzed in this paper. Next 
we formally state the model assumptions. 
3.2 General Assumptions 
The expected wealth increase  when an auditor takes the exam at age a can be expressed 
as: 
 = 𝑏(𝑟 − 𝑎)𝑃 ( g ≥  𝑔) − f 
where f, b and r are positive parameters equal for all the auditors. The parameter f 
represent the costs of taking the exam, which includes the fees and other costs that are not useful 
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for next exams, for example time displacement or some hours of study. The parameter b 
represents the difference in annual wages due to the CPA certification. The parameter r is the 
final year of the auditors’ career, so r-a are the years that the auditors will enjoy the CPA 
certification if they pass the exam. The probability of passing the exam, 𝑃 ( g >  𝑔), is the 
probability that the exam score g is higher than the minimum score required to pass the exam 
𝑔. 
The exam score (g = 𝜇 + 𝛾 c + ) is an imperfect measure of the auditors’ capabilities c 
given that we assume that  is a random variable uncorrelated with the auditors capabilities 
which is equally and independently distributed among auditors and follows a normal 
distribution with mean equal to zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝜀. The parameter 𝜇 is the expected 
score in the exam of an auditor with a capability equal to zero and 𝛾 is a positive parameter that 
transforms the measurements of capabilities into scores. 
The capabilities of the auditors are given by c = m + 𝜏 a, where 𝜏 is a positive parameter 
and equal for all the auditors indicating the yearly increase of their capabilities. The variable m 
is the capability of the auditor at age 0, so the “employer-learning models” usually refer to this 
variable as the innate ability. Section 3.3 discusses the information available in the market about 
the innate ability of the auditors and about the most appropriate interpretation of this variable 
in our context.  
Each year a cohort of auditors enter in the labor market and another one is retired. As a 
consequence, each year all the cohorts are promoted, i.e. are allocated to a new hierarchical 
position and there is no substitutability among the auditors of different cohorts. This is assumed 
because unfortunately in the empirical application we do not have information about the 
hierarchical levels of the auditors. 
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This is a never ending process. The auditors of the entry cohort have to be allocated to 
different firms and positions. Then they will be promoted. So we reduce the analysis to four 
jobs where the auditors of a cohort can be allocated, with (CPA=1) and without CPA 
certification (CPA=0), and to Big (Big4=1) and non-Big 4 firms (Big4=0). Although the main 
empirical application is focused on these firms, we also provide empirical evidence related with 
Top 7 audit firms. By law, an auditor without a CPA certification cannot occupy a position 
requiring the certification.  
The auditors’ annual production depends on the match between auditors and job positions 
in the following way: 
Y=  𝜗 +  𝑚 + 𝜏𝑎 + (𝜑𝑚 − 𝛿)𝐵𝑖𝑔4 +𝐶𝑃𝐴 ∗ 𝑏 
The parameter 𝜗 is the production of a person with zero capabilities working for a non-
Big 4 firm (Big4=0) and in a job position where CPA Certification is not required (CPA=0). 
The parameters 𝜑 and 𝛿 are positive. The marginal productivity of one unit of innate ability is 
higher in Big 4 than in non-Big 4 firms (which is 𝜑 >0). The productivity of an auditor having 
neither CPA certification nor capabilities (𝛿 >0) is higher in non-Big 4 firms than in Big 4 firms. 
Those auditors with innate abilities higher than 𝑚𝐵=δ/𝜑 will be more productive in Big 4 firms 
than in non-Big 4 firms (the reverse occurs for auditors with innate abilities lower than 𝑚𝐵). 
Based on the information available about the auditors’ innate abilities (see Section 3.3) they 
will be allocated to the job position where they are expected to be more productive. The 
production (Y) is the wealth generated by matching an auditor and a firm. The auditor wage 
determines (w) the way that this wealth is shared (Y-w for the firm and w for the auditor). Then, 
it is in the interest of both agents to choose the match that maximizes the production. This match 
is Pareto-Optimal. Compared with less productive matches, it is always possible to establish 
higher wages without decreasing the profits of the firm. For simplicity we do not model the 
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wage negotiation process assuming from now that auditors’ wages are equal to their expected 
production7.  
3.3 Assumptions about the information related with the auditors’ capabilities  
The variable m (called innate ability until now) plays different roles in our model. First, 
this is a way to recognize that the capabilities of the auditors are determined by other factors 
different than their age. So m is capturing the heterogeneity of capabilities among the auditors 
of the same cohort. For simplicity, we assume that the distribution of m among a cohort of 
auditors follows a normal distribution with an expected value mE and standard deviation 𝜎𝑚, so  
M (𝑚) = Φ (
𝑚−𝑚𝐸
𝜎𝑚
). Then, we assume that m has the same cumulative distribution function 
(cdf) M (m) among the population of each cohort of auditors. Take not that when 𝜎𝑚= 0 there 
is no heterogeneity, the differences of capabilities among the auditors of the same cohort is null.  
The second role is to consider the existence of imperfect information about the auditor’s 
capabilities. As usual in the “employer-learning models”, we model a situation where firms and 
auditors have symmetric but imperfect information about auditors’ capabilities. Our model 
follows pretty close Murphy (1986). So when 𝜎𝑚> 0, the real capability of auditor i (𝑐𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖 + 
𝜏𝑎𝑖) is unknown, due that this is the case with the concrete value of 𝑚𝑖. 
Therefore, we are going to differentiate between the real capability of auditor i (𝑐𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖 
+ 𝜏𝑎𝑖) and their predicted capability at a certain period of time t (𝑐𝑖
𝑡= 𝑚𝑖
𝑡 + 𝜏𝑎𝑖). While the 
auditors’ performances are due to their real capabilities, all the decisions are based on their 
predicted capabilities. Real and predicted capabilities will be the same in the case of perfect 
information. Due the data available, we are going to focus on two periods, before the exam 
(period t = 0) and after the exam (period t =1), so we are going to talk about two predicted 
                                                          
7 Most of the negotiation models (except in the cases that the firm appropriates all the wealth) predict that the 
auditors’ wages will be positively correlated with their productivity. 
15 
 
capabilities: the prior (before knowing the score of the exam) and the posterior (after knowing 
the score of the exam). It seems reasonable to assume that the real capability is not modified by 
the fact of doing the exam, so it is assumed that 𝑚𝑖 is the same before and after the exam. Then, 
it is clear that we are talking about the capabilities at the time of taking the exam and not about 
innate capabilities. From now we are going to refer to 𝑚𝑖 as real ability and 𝑚𝑖
𝑡 as predicted 
ability at period t. Now we are going to discuss the information available for predicting the 
ability of the auditors before taking the exam, prior predicted ability 𝑚𝑖
0. 
  
Prior to the exam (period t = 0), the auditors and firms know the distribution but not 
exactly the concrete ability of each auditor. Previously, they have accumulated information 
about the performance of each auditor. We assume that the distribution of the values of this 
information (I0) among a cohort of auditors follows a normal with expected value E(I0)=m
E 
variance 𝜎0
2 = var(I0) and  the correlation with the distribution of real abilities is 𝜌0 (Section 
3.5 provides further discussion about these assumptions). This information is uncorrelated with 
the luck in the exam (). At period t=0 it is available particular information about an auditor 
(Ii,0). All the agents are rational and update their expectations accordingly with the information 
available, so they use Bayesian inference. Following usual results in econometrics (De Groot, 
1970) the predicted  ability of auditor i will be a normally distributed random variable, with 
expected value 𝑚𝑖
0= E(m/Ii,0)  = m
E + 𝜎𝑚
𝜌0
𝜎𝐼
  (𝐼𝑖,0 − 𝑚
𝐸) and variance  var(m/Ii,0) = (1-𝜌0
2)𝜎𝑚
2 . 
Consequently, before taking the exam, the score of the exam for an auditor i is a normally 
distributed random variable with an expected value of E(g/𝐼𝑖,0) = 𝜇 + 𝛾(𝑚𝑖
0+ 𝜏 a ) and variance 
𝜎2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑔/𝐼𝑖,0) = 𝜎𝜀
2 +  𝛾2(1 − 𝜌0
2)𝜎𝑚
2 . In the next section we analyze the decisions of 
taking the exam based only on the auditors’ prior predicted abilities, so there is no room for 
confusion with the real abilities (or posterior predicted abilities). For simplifying notation, we 
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are going to use m in the next section for referring to the predicted abilities of the auditor before 
taking the exam. This does not mean that we are assuming that 𝜌0
2 =1, a situation of perfect 
information, just that the conclusions are practically the same8 as in a situation of imperfect 
information (𝜌0
2 <1), although in the first case real abilities and prior predicted abilities are the 
same while this does not occur in the second case.  
Therefore, the probability of obtaining a CPA Certification 𝑃 ( g > 𝑔) = 1 −
𝑃 ( g ≤  𝑔) can be written as:  
𝑃 ( g > 𝑔) = 1 − Φ((𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝛾(𝑚 +  𝜏 𝑎))/σ) 
where Φ() is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) and 𝜙() is the probability 
distribution function (pdf) of a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
3.4 The decision of taking the exam: The model solution 
The auditors will take the exam at the age 𝑎∗ that maximizes their expected wealth 
increase9:  
 = 𝑏(𝑟 − 𝑎)(1 − Φ (
𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝛾𝑚 − 𝛾𝜏𝑎
σ
)) − f 
The following proposition summarizes the results: 
Proposition 1: An auditor with prior predicted ability m maximizes the expected wealth 
increase  if the CPA exam is taken at the age: 
                                                          
8 Aside from the differences in the variance of scores, 𝜎2, there is also a technical difference. In the case of perfect 
information, the optimal age 𝑎𝑖
∗(𝑚) is interpreted as the age that an auditor with innate ability m take the exam. In 
the case of imperfect information, it is interpreted that at the age of   𝑎𝑖
∗  all the auditors with prior predicted 
abilities m ≤ 𝑎𝑖
∗−1(𝑚) will take the exam, if they have not took it before. This is due to the fact that predicted 
abilities can change overtime. 
9  We also solved the model including restrictions like there are minimum legal requirements (and then age) for 
applying or that the expected wealth increase has to be positive. The main implications are the same. The difference 
is that now the ages are restricted to a certain interval of values. Proofs can be provided upon request. 
17 
 
𝑎∗ = (𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝛾𝑚)/𝛾𝜏 – 
𝜎
𝛾𝜏
H  -1(
𝛾𝜏
σ
𝑟 −
𝑔−𝜇−𝛾𝑚
σ
) ≡ 𝑎∗(𝑚) 
Where x=H-1(𝑧) is the inverse function of z = H(𝑥)=  
1−Φ(𝑥)
𝜙(𝑥)
 – x = Ψ(𝑥) – x, being  Ψ(𝑥)  
the Mills’ ratio.  
 
Proofs: It is well establish that Ψ(𝑥) < 
1
𝑥
  for all x > 0, being the lim
𝑥→∞
Ψ(𝑥) =
1
𝑥
 (See 
Gordon 1941).  From these results, lim
𝑥→∞
𝐻(𝑥) =   −∞, and making the change of variable 𝑑 =
−𝑥, yields lim
𝑥→−∞
𝐻(𝑥) = lim
𝑑→∞
1
𝜙(𝑑)
−
1−Φ(𝑑)
𝜙(𝑑)
+ 𝑑 = ∞. It can also be established that lim
𝑥→∞
𝑧 =
−∞ and 
𝑑𝐻() 
𝑑x
= 𝑥 Ψ(𝑥) − 2 < −1 being lim
𝑥→∞
𝑑𝐻() 
𝑑x
 = −1. Let us to define x=(𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝛾𝑚 −
𝛾𝜏𝑎∗)/σ and take note that from the assumptions made: 
𝑑 𝑃 (𝑎) / 𝑑 𝑎 =
𝛾𝜏
σ
𝑑 Φ/ 𝑑𝑎 =  
𝛾𝜏
σ
𝜙((𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝛾𝑚 − 𝛾𝜏𝑎)/σ) > 0  
The first order condition (FOC) for a maximum (or minimum) of the expected wealth 
increase  is: 
FOC: b((𝑟 − 𝑎∗)
𝛾𝜏
σ
𝜙(𝑥) − (1 − Φ(𝑥))) = 0 
The optimal age 𝑎∗  will always be lower than r. The first order condition and the second 
order will be fulfilled if and only if: 
FOC: 
𝛾𝜏
σ
𝑟 −
𝑔−𝜇−𝛾𝑚
σ
 -  H(𝑥) = 0 
SOC:  
𝛾𝜏
σ
𝑑𝐻(𝑥)
𝑑(𝑥)
 < 0 
Thus, for any m there is a unique age that maximizes the expected wealth increase : 
𝑎∗ = (𝑔 − 𝜇 − 𝛾𝑚)/𝛾𝜏 – 
𝜎
𝛾𝜏
H-1(
𝛾𝜏
σ
𝑟 −
𝑔−𝜇−𝛾𝑚
σ
)  QED.  
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The next corollary summarizes the implication of the equation above and relates the 
decision to take the exam to the firm at which the auditor is working.  
Corollary 1: The auditors’ age at the time of taking the CPA exam decreases with their 
prior predicted abilities. Among those that have decided to take the exam, it is expected that 
younger auditors on average will get higher scores. Given that those auditors with prior 
predicted abilities m >𝑚𝐵 will be allocated to Big 4 firms, the results above imply that: 
a) They take the exam earlier than those allocated to non-Big 4 firms. 
b) When they take the exam, they have higher expected scores than those allocated 
to non-Big 4 firms. 
Proofs: Auditors with higher prior predicted abilities will do the exam earlier due to  
𝑑𝑎∗
𝑑𝑚
 
= −
1
𝜏
(1 + 
𝑑𝐻−1(z) 
𝑑z
) is negative given that -1<
𝑑𝐻−1(z) 
𝑑z
<0. When they take the exam they have 
higher expected capabilities, and consequently, expected scores due that 
𝑑𝐸(𝑔)
𝑑𝑚
=
𝛾
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑚
  and 
𝑑𝑐
𝑑𝑚
=  1 + 𝜏
𝑑𝑎∗
𝑑𝑚
= - 
𝑑𝐻−1(z) 
𝑑z
 > 0. The results related with differences between Big 4 
and non-Big 4 firms are immediate. QED.  
The empirical implications of Corollary 1 are summarized in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  Auditors allocated to Big 4 firms will take the exam earlier.  
Hypothesis 2:  The score in the exam will be negatively related to the age of the auditors 
when taking the exam. 
Furthermore, Corollary 1 suggests that the scores of the exam will be higher for those 
auditors working at Big 4 firms. A literal interpretation of Corollary 1 suggests that the effect 
disappears when it is controlled for the age of the auditors. However, a more relaxed 
interpretation, for example assuming that there are other random factors that affect the decision 
of taking the exam, will suggest that after controlling for age the effect is reduced but not 
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eliminated altogether. Appendix I provides a further discussion. A final empirical implication 
of Corollary 1 is that:  
Hypothesis 3:  The average score in the exam will be higher for auditors at Big 4 firms 
than for auditors at non-Big 4 firms. This difference decreases when we control for the 
age of the auditor.  
3.5 Information about capabilities: wages and scores 
The existence of imperfect information about auditors’ capabilities implies that the exam 
score adds information about the real capabilities of the auditors. Consequently, the exam score 
will be used for updating the initially predicted capabilities of the auditors and a positive 
correlation between wages and exam scores is expected. In fact, the model also suggests that 
some auditors move to other firms. Because of lack of data we omit this analysis. 
This section summarizes the predictions of the model regarding the wages before and 
after the exam. For avoiding misunderstandings, in this section 𝑚𝑖  refers to the real ability of 
auditor i ; 𝑚𝑖
0  indicates the prior (before knowing the score of the exam) and 𝑚𝑖
1  is the 
posterior (after exam) predicted (by firms and auditors) abilities. The wage of auditors at period 
t are equal to the auditors’ expected productivity, which depends on their predicted abilities at 
that period: 
𝑤𝑖
𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑌/𝑚𝑖
𝑡) = 𝜗 +  𝑚𝑖
𝑡 + 𝜏𝑎𝑖
𝑡 + (𝜑𝑚𝑖
𝑡 − 𝛿)𝐵𝑖𝑔4 +𝐶𝑃𝐴 ∗ 𝑏 
At period 0, the exam score provides more information about the real abilities of the 
auditors. Given that we have assumed gi =𝜇+ γ (mi + 𝜏𝑎𝑖) + i, we can define the following 
signal 𝑠𝑖,0 = (g𝑖 − 𝜇) 𝛾⁄ − 𝜏𝑎𝑖
∗ = 𝑚𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖,0. Consequently, the distribution of these signals s 
among a cohort of the population, is a random variable normally distributed with mean E(s)= 
mE; variance 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑠) =  𝜎𝑠
2 = (𝜎𝑚
2 + (𝜎𝜀 𝛾)⁄
2
) and correlated with real abilities 𝜌𝑠 =
𝜎𝑚
𝜎𝑠
. 
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Previously to the scores, firms and auditors have accumulated information I0. Let us to interpret 
this information as a collection of J signals10 (𝑠𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑗) each one of them (j= 1, … , 𝐽) 
equally informative as the scores, so 𝑢𝑖,𝑗 is the realization for auditor i at period j of independent 
random variables equally distributed as a normal with mean equal to zero and standard deviation 
σu = 𝜎𝜀 𝛾⁄ . 
Corollary 2 establishes the main implications of all these assumptions and it is also the 
basis for defining the wage equation presented below. 
Corollary 2 (Intermediate result):  The posterior (after the CPA exam) predicted ability 
of auditor i can be written as: 
𝑚𝑖
1 = (
𝑔𝑖 − 𝜇
𝛾
) (
1
𝐽 + 1 +
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑚
2
) + 𝑚𝑖
0 (1 −
1
𝐽 + 1 +
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑚
2
) − 𝜏𝑎𝑖
∗(
1
𝐽 + 1 +
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑚
2
) 
Proofs: The real ability of auditors at period t that have the same average of signals, or 
information 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = ( ∑
𝑠𝑖,𝑗
𝐽+𝑡
𝐽
𝑗=1−𝑡 ), follows a normal distribution (De Groot, 1970) with an 
expected value of 𝐸(𝑚/𝐼𝑖,𝑡)  =  𝑚𝑖
𝑡 = mE + 𝜎𝑚
𝜌𝑡
𝜎𝑡
  (𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑚
𝐸) and variance var(m/𝐼𝑖,𝑡) = (1-
𝜌𝑡
2) 𝜎𝑚
2 . Following Murphy (1986), 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐼𝑡) = 𝜎𝑚
2 +
𝜎𝑢
2
𝐽+𝑡
 is the variance of values 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 
among the population of auditors of a certain cohort, while 𝜌𝑡 =
𝜎𝑚
𝜎𝑡
 is the correlation of those 
values with the distribution of real abilities among the population (var(It/m)= 
𝜎𝑢
2
𝐽+𝑡
= (1-𝜌0
2)𝜎𝑡
2). 
Let us call 𝑚𝐸 the predicted ability of an auditor when there is no information, while 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the 
information available about the auditor i abilities. The predicted ability 𝑚𝑖
𝑡 of auditor i at period 
t will be a weighted average of both: 𝑚𝑖
𝑡 = mE (1- 𝑋𝑖
𝑡) + 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝑋𝑖
𝑡. The weight of the information 
                                                          
10 One could argue that the number of signals collected is related with the age of the auditors, J= 𝑎𝑖
∗. This 
complicates the algebra without important changes in main conclusions. Appendix II discusses the implications of 
this assumption.  
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is 𝑋𝑖
𝑡 =  𝜎𝑚
𝜌𝑡
𝜎𝑡
=
1
1+
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑚
2 (𝐽+𝑡)
< 1. From the equation above, 𝑚𝑖
0 = (1 −
1
1+
𝜎𝑢
2
𝐽𝜎𝑚
2
)𝑚𝐸  +
1
1+
𝜎𝑢
2
𝐽𝜎𝑚
2
 (∑ 𝑠𝑖,𝑗
−1
𝑗=0 /𝐽). With some algebra can be computed 𝑚𝑖
1 taking into account that 𝑠𝑖,0 =
(g𝑖 − 𝜇) 𝛾⁄ − 𝜏𝑎𝑖
∗ and 𝐼𝑖,1 =  
𝑠𝑖,0+𝐼𝑖,0 𝐽
𝐽+1
. QED. 
Corollary 2 (Final result):  The theoretical wage equation depends on the firm for which 
the auditor works and whether the auditor has the CPA certification or not. The theoretical 
wage equation is: 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝜗 +  𝑚𝑖
0 + 𝜏𝑎𝑖
∗ + (𝜑𝑚𝑖
0 − 𝛿)𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖+ 
𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝑏 + 𝜏 + (
𝑔𝑖 − 𝜇
𝛾
− 𝜏𝑎𝑖
∗ − 𝑚𝑖
0) (
1 + 𝜑𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖
𝐽 + 1 +
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑚
2
)) 
Proof: Take into account that the auditor’s age when she takes the exam is 𝑎𝑖
∗ and 𝑎𝑖
∗ + 1 
the period after. Replacing the posterior (to the CPA certification) predicted ability 𝑚𝑖
1 of an 
auditor i into the wage expression of 𝑤𝑖
𝑡 and, with some algebra, the theoretical wage equation 
is obtained. QED. 
The main empirical implication from Corollary 2 is that the exam score provides new 
information to the market agents about the real capabilities of the auditors. This information is 
used for updating the predictions about the real capabilities of the auditors and consequently 
the wages after the CPA certification will be positively correlated with the exam scores. This is 
summarized in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: After controlling for the age of the auditor, the wages of the auditors after 
the CPA certification will be positively correlated with the score in the exam.  
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The parameter 
(
1
𝛾
)(1+𝜑𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖)
𝐽+1+
𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑚
2
 suggests that the relationship between the score and wage is 
stronger in Big 4 firms, and furthermore ((𝜑𝑚𝑖
0 − 𝛿)𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖) suggests that the wages at Big 4 
firms are higher before certification (due that auditors with innate abilities higher than 𝑚𝐵=δ/𝜑 
will be allocated in Big 4 firms). These empirical implications are summarized in the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5: Wages are higher in Big 4 firms than in non-Big 4 firms. 
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between the score and wage is stronger in Big 4 firms 
than in non-Big 4 firms. 
 
4.   Empirical approach 
4.1 Data  
We use samples with CPA exam results and compensation data for testing the empirical 
predictions. The CPA exam data (denoted Sample A below) contains observations for 1,377 
auditors attempting to take the CPA exam for the first time between 2007 and 2012. The data 
was received from SBPA and contains auditors that passed and failed in the exam. The data 
includes information about the date of the exam, the individual score in the exam, name, gender, 
birth date, as well as the name of the employer and the location of the audit office at the moment 
of taking the exam. The sample was composed as follows. We started with 2,386 observations 
for the 2006 to 2012 period. We excluded observations for the year 2006 and only included an 
observation the first time it appeared in the data in order to assure that only the observation 
when the auditor attempted to take the exam for the first time is included in the sample. We 
also excluded 21 observations for auditors already having an old type of certification allowing 
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them to audit small companies when they did the CPA exam leaving 1,377 observations for 
further analyses. 
The compensation data (Sample B) includes wages two years before the CPA 
certification, the year of certification and the year after certification of 431 auditors that 
received the CPA certification in years 2006 to 2009. This is a balanced panel with 1,724 
observations.  
The sample was composed as follows. We received the salary income and total income 
for each individual being active as a CPA at the end of 2011 from Ratsit, a business and credit 
information company. We started with 723 auditors that passed the exam in years 2006 to 2009 
but the employer turnover is high at audit firms in the early phase of the career implying that 
income data was missing for 150 leaving 573 auditors.11 Finally, in order to eliminate auditors 
if they have been on parental or sick leave, we exclude observations if the annual income is 
lower than SEK 240 thousand. These criteria resulted in an omission of 142 auditors leaving a 
balanced panel with 1,724 auditor-years and 431 auditors for the analyses. 
4.3 Econometric models 
We estimate the following equations on Sample A: 
ai = 𝛽 +  𝛽1𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘−1,𝑖
𝐾+2
𝑘=2  + 𝑣1,𝑖                         [1] 
gi = 𝛼 +  𝛼1𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑎𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝑋𝑘−2,𝑖
𝐾+3
𝑘=3  + 𝑣2,𝑖   [2] 
where X’s are K control variables, 𝛼′𝑠 and 𝛽′𝑠 are parameters to be estimated and v’s are 
error terms. Hypothesis 1 implies that 𝛽1 < 0, Hypothesis 2 that 𝛼2 < 0 and Hypothesis 3 that 
𝛼1 > 0 .  The following variables are used in the empirical estimations of the equations. The 
age of the auditor (ai) at the time of attempting to take the CPA exam for the first time is 
                                                          
11 Our files include exam results also for 2010 to 2012 but we restrict the analyses to the 2006-2009 period in order 
to have income data at least for at least one year after the certification. 
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measured in years (age of the auditor in days divided by 365.25). The score in the CPA exam 
(gi) is measured as the points received when the auditor attempted to take the exam for the first 
time. The maximum points in the exam are 100, the minimum is 0 and at least 75 points is 
needed in order to pass the exam. Note that this sample includes auditors that passed as well as 
failed in the exam. Big 4 is measured with an indicator variable taking the value one if the firm 
is audited by Ernst & Young, PwC, KPMG or Deloitte and zero otherwise12. Controls for gender 
(Female), location of the office (Stockholm, Malmo or Gothenburg) and exam time fixed effects 
are included. 
Sample B provides data for estimating the empirical approximation to the theoretical 
wage equation derived in Corollary 2: 
wi= 𝜃 +  𝜃1𝑎𝑖 + 𝜃2𝐵𝑖𝑔 4𝑖 + 𝜃3𝑔𝑖 + 𝐶𝑃𝐴𝑖(𝜃4 +  𝜃5𝑎𝑖 + 𝜃6𝑔𝑖) + ∑ 𝜃𝑘𝑋𝑘−5,𝑖
𝐾+6
𝑘=6 +𝑣3,𝑖     [3] 
where 𝜃′𝑠 are parameters to be estimated. Hypothesis 4 implies that 𝜃6 > 0 and 𝜃3 = 0, 
Hypothesis 5 that 𝜃2 > 0 and Hypothesis 6 refers to differences in parameter 𝜃6between Big 4 
firms and non-Big 4 firms.  Furthermore, from the theoretical wage equation and given the 
assumptions made along section 3 one would expect that wages increases with age (𝜃1>0), that 
CPA Certification is associated with higher wages (𝜃4 > 0) and a negative interaction between 
age and the CPA Certification,  (𝜃5 < 0). Note that our predictions about the coefficients 𝜃1, 𝜃2 
and  𝜃5  of equation [3] has been made assuming that the error terms 𝑣3,𝑖  are independent of 
the exam age of the auditor. Appendix III provides further discussion of why this could not be 
the case and its implications. We measure CPA with an indicator variable taking the value one 
in the year when the auditor receives the CPA certification and in subsequent years. 
Consequently, the variable takes the value zero in the two years in the data before the CPA 
                                                          
12 We conducted several tests for checking if there are differences among the Big 4 firms in the regressions 
estimated. Overall, the main results are qualitatively similar for all Big 4 firms. 
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certification. We include controls for gender (Female) and location (Stockholm, Malmo or 
Gothenburg) in the empirical estimates of the equations.  
 
  5.   Empirical findings 
5.1 Capability of auditors measured with age and performance in the CPA exam  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the continuous variables in Sample A classified 
by Big 4 affiliation. Two thirds of the auditors taking the exam for the first time come from Big 
4 audit firms. The mean (median) age of the auditors (ai) at non Big 4 firms when they attempted 
to take the CPA exam for the first time is 34.1 (32.01) years. The mean (median) age of auditors 
at Big 4 firms is 31.4 (30.3) years. The difference in means is significant at the 0.01 level.  
The 10th and 90th percentiles of the age distribution are 27.81 years and 36.17 years for 
auditors at Big 4 firms. The corresponding figures for auditors at non-Big 4 firms are 28.02 
years and 42.87 years. CPA certification requires a university degree and the average age when 
students in Sweden graduate from university is 29.4 years.13 Thus, these figures indicate that 
most auditors have started to work at audit firms soon after the graduation in order to get the 
practical experience needed for the CPA certification. However, there seems also to be a group 
that is older and most probably have had another work before starting to target a CPA 
certification. In supplementary analyses, we study whether the key results in our tests of 
equation [1] change when the oldest auditors are excluded. 
The mean (median) points (gi) in the CPA exam is 70.86 (73) points for auditors at non-
Big 4 firms and 75.27 (76) points for auditors at Big 4 firms. 49.46 % (227 / 459) of the auditors 
at the non-Big 4 firms and 65.14 % (598 / 918) of the auditors at Big 4 firms passed the CPA 
exam. These figures are averages for the entire sample and the average pass rates among the 
                                                          
13 Taken from http://www.ekonomifakta.se/sv/Fakta/Utbildning-och-forskning/Utbildningsniva/Examensalder/ 
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auditors taking the exam for the first time vary somewhat between exam-dates. The data covers 
12 exams between 2007 and 2012 and the highest and lowest pass rates in these years are 69.84 
% and 52.67 % respectively (not reported in tables).  
Regarding binary variables in Sample A, 45.97 % of the auditors at non-Big 4 firms are 
female while this figure is 51.53 % at Big 4 firms. The difference is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level. 40.38 % of the auditors come from Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, 12.71 % 
from Gothenburg and 6.61 % (the second and third largest cities in Sweden). There are no 
significant differences in the location of the workplaces for auditors at Big 4 and non-Big 4 
firms (not reported in tables).  
Table 2 includes OLS estimations of equation [1] and [2] with Huber/White standard 
errors. The left-hand regression in the table includes the estimation of equation [1]. The 
regression is significant at the 0.001 level with R2 equal to 10.40%. Hypothesis 1 predicts that 
auditors at Big 4 firms will take the CPA exam earlier. The coefficient of Big 4 has the predicted 
negative sign and it suggests that auditors at Big 4 firms are 2.67 years younger than auditors 
at non-Big 4 firms when they attempted to take the exam. The coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the 0.01 level.  
As pointed out above, some auditors in the sample are fairly old and most probably had 
other jobs before starting to work as an auditor. We attempted to re-estimate equation [1] after 
having excluded the top quartile of auditors that are older than 34.10 years. The coefficient of 
Big 4 is then -0.22 (p-value 0.09). This is a smaller coefficient than in Table 2 and the reason 
is that a higher fraction of the auditors that were old when they attempted to take the exam work 
for non-Big 4 firms. Even in this case Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
The right-hand regressions in Table 2 include OLS estimates of equation [2] with and 
without age as a control variable. Both models are significant at the 0.001 level and the R2 of 
the regressions are 6.73 % and 17.07 % respectively. These regressions provide tests of 
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Hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the score in the exam (gi) decreases with the age 
of the auditor. The empirical results reported in the right-hand regression in the table show that 
age (ai) has a negative coefficient significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient estimate shows 
that “ceteris paribus” a candidate on average obtains 0.69 points more than a candidate who is 
one year older.  
We attempted to estimate regression (3) by including an interaction between Big 4 and 
age in order to study whether the result that younger auditors perform better is driven by audit 
firm affiliation. These results show that the association is negative and significant for auditors 
at Big 4 as well as non-Big 4 firms (not reported). We also attempted to estimate regression (2) 
with audit-firm fixed effects (not reported).14 The age of the auditors (ai) has negative 
coefficients significant at the 0.01 level suggesting that the negative association between age 
and performance in the exam holds when human capital investments are controlled for. In 
summary, the results strongly support Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that auditors at Big 4 firms perform better in the CPA exam than 
auditors at non-Big 4 firms. The coefficient of Big 4 is 4.52 in the regression without control 
for age and it is 2.74 in the regression with a control for age. The coefficient of Big 4 is 
significant at the 0.01 level in both regressions. Furthermore, a Wald-test shows that the 
difference in the coefficient estimates of Big 4 in regressions (2) and (3) is significant (p-value 
< 0.001). Thus, the empirical results support the predictions that auditors at Big 4 firms do 
better in the CPA exam and that the difference in performance between auditors at Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 firms decreases when we control for age. 
Finally, we attempted to run logistic regressions with an indicator variable taking the 
value one if the auditor passed the exam (results not reported). The odds-ratio of Big 4 in the 
                                                          
14 More exactly, the regression included audit firm fixed effects for each firm with three or more auditors 
attempting to take the exam. Audit firms with only one or two auditors taking the exam were in the same category. 
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regression with the same explanatory variables as in regression (2) in Table 2 is 1.89 (p-value 
< 0.001) and the odds-ratio is 1.37 (p-value = 0.02) in a regression with the same explanatory 
variables as in regression (3). This suggests that auditors at Big 4 firms are 89 % more likely to 
pass without control for age and 37 % more likely when age is controlled for. 
5.2 Wages, scores and further related evidence 
Table 1 also presents the descriptive statistics on the continuous variables in Sample B 
partitioned by Big 4 affiliation. It can be seen that 59 % of the observations are for auditors at 
Big 4 firms. This proportion is slightly lower than in Sample A. Furthermore, 47 % (38 %) of 
the auditors at Big 4 firms (non-Big 4 firms) are female, which is also slightly lower proportions 
than in Sample A. These differences in sample compositions are likely to be driven by the fact 
that the auditors in Sample B are in a somewhat later phase of their careers.  
It can be seen from Table 1 that mean log of annual wages in thousand SEK (wi) is 5.93 
and 5.99 for auditors at non-Big 4 and Big 4 firms respectively (p-value < 0.001). This means 
that the average annual salaries in Swedish krona are 380.5 and 409.7 thousand (in USD, 44.8 
and 48.2 thousand). Furthermore, the differences in annual wages between auditors at Big 4 
and non-Big 4 firms are increasing with the phase in the career; it is 20.7 thousand SEK two 
years before passing the CPA exam, 34.9 thousand SEK in the year of passing, and 42.9 
thousand SEK in the year after passing the CPA exam (not reported in tables). 
Table 3 presents estimates of equation [3]. The left-hand regression (regression 4) 
includes an OLS estimate on the full Sample B, while the mid-regression and right-hand 
regression include estimates on the sub samples with only Big 4 (regression 5)  and non-Big 4  
auditors respectively (regression 6). All regressions are significant at the 0.001 level and the R2 
of the regressions vary between 27.23% and 29.37%. Robust standard errors clustered on 
auditors (Rogers 1993) are reported in the regressions. As described above, the sample is made 
up of a balanced panel with 1,724 observations for 431 auditors. Recall also that we use the log 
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of wages (LnW) as the dependent variable implying that coefficient estimates approximately 
express the change in wages as a percent for each unit of change in the dependent variable. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts a positive correlation between wages after having received the CPA 
certification and the score in the CPA exam. The coefficient of the interaction CPA*Score 
expresses this association and its value in regression 4 is 0.0057 which is statistically significant 
(p-value < 0.01). For each point more in the CPA exam, auditors receive on average around 
0.57% higher wages. Score (𝑔𝑖) in Table 3 captures the potential association between the 
performance in the CPA exam and wages before the auditor has taken the CPA exam. A positive 
association would suggest that the information about the ability conveyed by the performance 
in the exam is known prior to the exam is taken, and furthermore, this information is taken into 
account in wages of auditors. However, the coefficient of Score is insignificant, which also is 
consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 4. 
The coefficient associated with Big 4 suggests that auditors at those firms have around 
7.86 % higher wages than auditors at non-Big 4 firms with similar ages before doing the exam. 
These differences are statistically significant which is consistent with Hypothesis 5. 
 Hypothesis 6 predicts that the association between the scores in the CPA exam and LnW 
is stronger for auditors at Big 4 firms. It can be seen from regressions 5 and 6 that the coefficient 
estimates of CPA*Score are 0.0058 and 0.0024 for auditors at Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms 
respectively. The coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.01 level for auditors at Big 4 firms 
and insignificant for auditors at non-Big 4 firms. However, although coefficient estimates 
indicate a stronger association in Big 4 firms, the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates 
are equal cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.22). Thus, we do not find clear support to Hypothesis 
6. 
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A further observation that can be made from Table 3 is that the coefficient of CPA is 
positive and significant, suggesting that auditors receive a higher salary after they have received 
the CPA certification than before the certification. Notice we have centered Score and Age in 
the regressions. Thus, the coefficient of CPA suggests that the average inflation adjusted salary 
is around 14.8% higher in the year of the CPA certification and the following year than in the 
two years prior to the certification for auditors with average Age and Score. A further 
noteworthy finding in Table 3 is that Age has a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting 
that older auditors are paid more. All these findings are pretty consistent with the predictions 
made in section 4.3. 
Referring to the other control variables, Female has a negative and significant coefficient 
in all models. The magnitude of the coefficient on the full sample indicates that female auditors 
earn around 7% less than male auditors. Finally, the location variables (Stockholm, Gothenburg 
and Malmö) are positive and significant (not reported) suggesting that auditors located in the 
major cities in Sweden earn more than auditors outside the major cities. 
5.3 Top 7 audit firms 
The audit firms Grant Thornton, BDO and SET Mazars are all fairly large in Sweden. In 
fact there is empirical evidence (Sundgren and Svanström 2013) suggesting that the quality of 
their auditing services are not significantly different than those provided by Big 4 firms and 
better than the remaining audit firms.  
Thus, we extend the classification of audit firms into three categories: Big 4, Next 3 and 
non-Top 7 firms. The following observations were made when we re-estimated the regressions 
in Table 2. Big 4 and Next 3 have negative coefficients significant at the 0.01 level in the 
regression with Age as the dependent variable (that is, a regression comparable with regression 
1). The coefficient estimates for Big 4 and Next 3 are -3.75 and -2.83 respectively. Thus, the 
results show that auditors at Big 4 firms are younger than auditors at Next 3 firms when they 
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take the exam but also that auditors at Next 3 firms are younger than auditors at non-Top 7 
firms. The difference between the coefficient estimates of Big 4 and Next 3 is significant (p-
value = 0.033).  
We also re-estimated the regressions with Score as the dependent variable. The coefficient 
estimate of Big 4 and Next 3 are 6.17 and 4.35 respectively in a regression without Age. Both 
coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level showing that auditors at Big 4 firms, as well as Next 
3 firms, perform better in the CPA exam than auditors at non-Top 7 firms. Furthermore, a Wald 
test shows that the differences in the coefficient estimates of Big 4 and Next 3 is significant at 
the 0.05 level.  
We also attempted to run the regression with Age as an additional control variable 
(comparable with regression 3). The coefficient estimates of Big 4 and Next 3 were then 3.75 
and 2.49, with a p-value lower than 0.001 and 0.016 respectively. The difference between the 
coefficient estimates of Big 4 and Next 3 was then insignificant (p-value = 0.124). In sum, the 
results suggest that auditors at Big 4 are younger and perform somewhat better in the CPA exam 
than auditors at the Next 3 firms. However, auditors at the Next 3 firms are younger and perform 
better in the exam than auditors at non-Top 7 audit firms.  
Next we estimated variants of equation [3] with the three audit firm categories. Firstly, 
we ran a regression on the full sample with the three audit firm categories. Surprisingly, Next 
3 had a negative coefficient (-0.033) significant at the 0.10 level indicating that auditors at Next 
3 firms obtain somewhat lower wages than auditors at non-Top 7 firms. The regression also 
showed that salaries are significantly higher in Big 4 firms than in Next 3 firms (p-value <0.01).  
Secondly, we tested Hypothesis 4 separately on the sub-samples with Big 4, Next 3 and 
non-Top 7 audit firms. The coefficients (p-values) of the interactions CPA*Score are 0.058 (p-
value = 0.002), 0.0045 (0.272) and 0.0020 (0.452) for Big 4 firms, Next 3 firms and non-Top 7 
firms respectively, indicating that the association is decreasing with audit firm size. However, 
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perhaps as a consequence of the small sample sizes, Wald tests show that the differences 
between the coefficients are insignificant. The number of observations in the Big4, Next 3 and 
non-Top 7 categories are only 1012, 236 and 476 respectively. In summary, the results are fairly 
consistent with a market of talent allocation where the competitiveness of the firms (in the sense 
of attracting and retaining more talented people) is positively related with its size. 
 
6.  Discussion and conclusions 
We study the Swedish audit market in order to get an understanding of how imperfect 
information about the differences in the capabilities of a cohort of auditors is reflected in the 
hiring and compensation policies in the early phase of auditors’ careers. Auditors need a 
minimum of three years of practical experience before they can take the CPA exam. However, 
the timing of the exam can be delayed if the auditor or the employer feels the auditor is not yet 
ready, suggesting that the timing of the exam may convey information about what they know 
relative to the capabilities of the auditor. We present a model suggesting that the predicted 
difference in capability is positively associated with the performance in the CPA exam and 
negatively associated with the age of the auditors when they take the exam for their first time. 
If the most capable auditors of a cohort are allocated in Big 4 firms, the model suggests that 
auditors at these firms will be younger when they take the exam and that they perform better. 
Our empirical results are consistent with these predictions. Indeed, an alternative explanation 
is that Big 4 firms invest more on the education, coaching and other human capital development 
activities than non-Big 4 audit firms.  Big 4 firms have large amounts of audit associates 
implying that they may take advantage of scale economies in the supervision and preparation 
of audit associates for audit work in general as well as the CPA exam. Although we cannot 
conclusively rule out this explanation, a result suggesting that innate ability plays a role is that 
the age of the auditors when they attempt to take the exam for the first time is negatively 
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associated with performance in the exam when we include audit firm fixed effects in the 
regressions as controls for human capital investments. A further result consistent with the view 
that Big 4 firms attempt to attract the more capable auditors is that wages at Big 4 firms are 
higher.  
Furthermore, based on the assumption that the results in the CPA exam is used to update 
the beliefs about the capabilities of auditors, we predict a positive association between the 
performance in the CPA exam and wage increases, and this association is expected to be 
stronger for auditors at Big 4 firms. Generally, our results are also consistent with these 
predictions, indicating that audit firms have imperfect information about auditors’ capabilities 
and that exam results provides new information.  
The main thesis of this study is that firms and auditors have information about the 
differences of capabilities among a cohort of auditors and this information is used for hiring 
and retaining auditors and deciding when to take and the performance in the CPA exam. 
However, we cannot rule out that parts of our results are driven by differences in incentives to 
put in effort. For example, the result that auditors at Big 4 firms are paid higher wages in the 
first years of their careers is consistent with the view that they are paid a wage premium in order 
to work hard (cf. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). Consequently, auditors at Big 4 firms are also 
expected to exert a higher effort in the preparation and execution of the CPA exam. Although 
input of effort could constitute a partial explanation to some of the results, it does not explain 
why a positive correlation between wages and the performance in the CPA exam is found at 
least if the input of effort is considered as a one-time event. On the other hand, if the ability to 
exert effort is a trait of an auditor, that is, he or she has the ability to continuously exert a high 
effort, then it can be considered as a component of the auditor’s capabilities in the model 
developed in this study. 
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  As pointed out in an article in the Economist, Big 4 accountancy firms has a lot to teach 
other companies about how to manage talent: “As the battle in the long-heralded “war for talent” 
is joined across industries and countries, it could be worth keeping an eye on how the Big Four 
are quietly leading the charge” (Accounting for good people, The Economist, July 21st of 2007).  
This study is one of surprisingly few studies attempting to use economic theory in order to 
analyze the personnel economics issues in the auditing industry. This study is a first attempt to 
fill this gap but further studies are needed in order to fully understand the hiring and retention 
policies in Big 4 firms. 
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Appendix I. The expected score and the age of taking the exam 
In this Appendix we discuss two possible origins of error terms in the relationship 
between expected scores and ages. The first one is related with linear approximations of the 
function. The second one is related with variations in other parameters of the model  ,,r and 
 . Finally we present the static comparative of the optimal age with respect these parameters. 
Linear approximations of the scores function. From Proposition 1, the expected score 
will be:  E(g) = 
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We can not observe the innate abilities of the auditors, but we can observe their decisions 
about the age of writing the CPA: 
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The first derivative implies Hypothesis 2. The second derivative implies a convexity in 
the relationship between expected scores and age. So for those with lower ages (Big 4) it is 
possible that the score is underestimated while for those with higher ages (non-big 4) the score 
will be overestimated (Hypothesis 3). 
Other parameters variations. Additionally to the innate abilities, could be other 
parameters that change among firms.  
The first order condition implies that: 
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 If  ,,r and   are equal among auditors, all the auditors that have made the exam at 
the same age will have the same expected score.  
But, given a certain age *a of writing the exam: 
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 this derivative is zero for x ≈ - 0,84 (or 80% 
of probability of success) and positive for higher values (negative for lower ones). 
For example, one could argue that the innate ability is not only a stock of capabilities, it 
can also affect the capacity to learning . If we expect that those auditors with higher learning 
capacities are allocated in Big 4 firms, then, even if we have controlled by the age of the 
auditors, we expect higher scores in Big 4 firms (Hypothesis 3). Mathematically, similar 
arguments can be replied for ,r and . 
Given the expression of 
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, if 𝜏 is higher in Big 4 firms, we will expect that the 
negative relationship between age and wages will be higher in Big4 firms than in the rest of 
firms. 
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Appendix II: Model solution when the information quality depends on the age 
In this Appendix we are going to revise the solution to the model (Section 3.3) assuming 
that J= 𝑎𝑖
∗. The main implication of this assumption is that the precision of the predicted innate 
ability changes with the age of the auditors. Accordingly with the assumptions made in Section 
3.2, this will be a random variable distributed like a normal with an expected value of E(m/𝐼𝑖,𝑡) 
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The auditors expected wealth increase is the same defined in the Section 3 of the paper, 
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Implications: 
The first order condition implies: 
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Let us to define Lm as the innate abilities that for a given a fulfils  
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Obviously we can define in a similar way Hm . Take note that Hm is lower than Lm so for 
sufficiently high values of f/b the wealth career increase associated with Hm will not be positive. 
We assume that this is the case, and they will not do the exam. 
  
40 
 
Appendix III: Error terms in empirical wage equations 
As commented in the text there are more and less strong tests of the model. The stronger 
test implies that we adopt literally Proposition 1. More relaxed tests assume that there are some 
random terms not considered in the model which affects the decision about the age of taking 
the exam.  
One can interpret the predictions about the parameters of equation [3] presented in the 
text as a relaxed test of the model. In this appendix we are going to discuss the implications of 
the stronger test of the model.  
From Proposition 1, the expected innate abilities of an auditor at the time of writing the 
exam are related with the age of writing it accordingly with the following relationship:  𝑚𝑖
0= m 
(𝑎∗) = 𝑎∗−1(𝑚). So the wage equation in Corollary 2 can be rewritten as: 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝜗 +  𝑐(𝑎𝑖
∗)+ (𝜑𝑚(𝑎𝑖
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Where 𝑐(𝑎𝑖
∗) is the capability of the worker at the age of taking the exam, which we have 
shown that it is decreasing with this age. The differences with the predictions made in the text 
are now: 
𝜃1<0 which is reinforced in the case of Big 4 firms.  𝜃2<0 and  𝜃5 > 0. So if we are closer 
to these coefficients (random errors in the exam age are not relevant) or the proposed in the text 
(random errors in the exam are relevant) is an empirical concern. 
Anyway, there are no changes in the predictions of hypothesis 4, 𝜃3, 𝜃6 and parameter 
𝜃4. Furthermore, in a literal interpretation of Proposition 1, the wages would be fully explained 
by the observed variables.  
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics  
 
Sample A: CPA exam data  
  Age (ai) Score 
 Non-Big 4 auditors (N=459) 
Mean 34.10  70.86 
Median 32.01  73.00 
p10 28.02  56.00 
p90 42.87  83.00 
Standard deviation 5.06  10.12 
 Big 4 auditors (N=918) 
Mean 31.40  75.27 
Median 30.34  76.00 
p10 27.81  63.00 
p90 36.17  86.00 
Standard deviation 6.44  11.44 
P-value <0.01  <0.01 
 
Sample B: Compensation data.  
 LnW Age (ai)
a  Scorea  
   Non-Big 4 auditors (N=712)   
Mean 5.93 0.74 -0.86 
Median 5.92 -0.63 -1.65 
p10 5.69 -4.26 -4.65 
p90 6.16 8.38 4.35 
Standard deviation 0.17 4.94 3.52 
   Big 4 auditors (N=1012)   
Mean 5.99 -0.52 0.61 
Median 5.98 -1.37 -0.65 
p10 5.71 -4.09 -4.65 
p90 6.27 4.29 7.35 
Standard deviation 0.23 3.40 4.43 
P-value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
 
Notes: P-values are for t-tests for the continuous variables and chi-square tests for the 
categorical variables. Variable definitions: Age is the age of the auditor in years at the date 
when the exam was taken; Score is the points in the CPA exam; Female is an indicator 
variable for females; LnW is the natural log of wages (in thousand SEK); CPA is an indicator 
variable taking the value one in years when the auditor has a CPA certification. 
a Variable is centered (value minus average is reported). 
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Table 2 OLS regressions of age of the auditor, or scores in the CPA exam, on audit firm 
affiliation, age and control variables. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Age (ai)            Score (gi) 
Big4 -2.665 4.521 2.744 
 (0.320)*** (0.626)*** (0.591)*** 
Age (ai) - - -0.691 
 - - (0.055)*** 
Female -0.004 0.116 0.091 
 (0.257) (0.537) (0.506) 
Location dummies NR NR NR 
Exam-date dummies - NR NR 
Constant 35.291 72.514 97.529 
 (0.382)*** (1.734)*** (2.689)*** 
Model  F-value 26.92*** 5.31*** 13.82*** 
R2 10.40% 6.73% 17.07% 
N 1,377 1,377 1,377 
 
Notes: *,**, *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
Variable definitions: Age is the age of the auditor in years at the date when the exam was 
taken; Score is the points in the CPA exam; Big 4 is an indicator variable taking the value 
one if the auditor works at PwC, KPMG, Ernst &Young or Deloitte; Female is an indicator 
variable for females; Location variables for Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmo are included in 
the regression and all other cities are in the reference group; the sample period covers twelve 
exams (two in each years) so eleven Exam-date dummies are included. 
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Table 3 OLS regression estimates of logarithm of compensation on score in the CPA exam, 
age at the time of writing the exam and audit firm affiliation. 
 
Dependent variable = LnW 
(4) 
All observations 
(5) 
Big 4 
(6) 
Non-Big 4 
Age (ai) 0.0104 0.0193 0.0057 
 (0.0029)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0021)*** 
Big4 0.0786 - - 
 (0.0142)*** - - 
Score (gi) 0.0007 0.0041 -0.0022 
 (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
CPA 0.1481 0.1549 0.1307 
 (0.0059)*** (0.0089)*** (0.0080)*** 
CPA*Age -0.0075 -0.0109 -0.0045 
 (0.0017)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0013)*** 
CPA*Score 0.0057 0.0058 0.0024 
 (0.0014)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0021) 
Female -0.0689 -0.0533 -0.0834 
 (0.0151)*** (0.0224)** (0.0185)*** 
Location dummies NR NR NR 
Constant 5.8083 5.8614 5.8379 
 (0.0122)*** (0.0152)*** (0.0130)*** 
Model F-value 85.59*** 65.62*** 37.69*** 
R2 28.08 % 29.37% 27.23% 
Max VIF 2.10 2.26 2.06 
Mean VIF 1.46 1.56 1.50 
N 1,724 1,012 712 
F-value for Wald-test:  
CPA*Scorereg.2 = CPA*Scorereg.3  1.48 
 
Notes: *,**, *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
Variable definitions: LnW is the logarithm of the annual wages; Age is the age of the auditor 
in years at the date when the exam was taken; Big 4 is an indicator variable taking the value 
one if the auditor works at PwC, KPMG, Ernst &Young or Deloitte; Score is the points in 
the CPA exam; CPA is an indicator variable taking the value one in the year when the auditor 
received certification and subsequent years and zero in years before certification; Female is 
an indicator variable for females; Location variables for Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmo are 
included in the regression and all other cities are in the reference group; Female is an indicator 
variable for females. 
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